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Irit Samet’s Equity develops a novel and philosophically rich interpretation of 
the body of law originating in the English Court of Chancery, the body of law 
known as ‘Equity.’1 Equity began as a response to particular cases where the 
rigid procedures of the common law led to substantive injustice. In such cases, 
the Court of Chancery could intervene to force individuals to act according to 
the dictates of ‘conscience.’ As Lord Ellesmere LC wrote, ‘when a Judgment is 
obtained by Oppression, Wrong and a hard Conscience, the Chancellor will frus-
trate and set it aside, not for any error or Defect in the Judgment, but for the 
hard Conscience of the Party.’2 Over time, Equity was itself systematized, and in 
the 1870s the separate courts responsible for Equity and common law were fused: 
from then on, one court could apply both bodies of law. But many Equitable 
doctrines retained the marks of their origin: broad principles, stated in morally 
freighted language (‘conscience,’ ‘clean hands,’ ‘loyalty,’ and so on) and applied 
in a  backwards-looking and fact-sensitive way (xv).3
The fusion of Equitable and common law courts raised the question whether 
the substantive bodies of law developed by these courts ought to be fused as well. 
Samet’s aim, in this constructive and tightly argued book, is to defend Equity 
against the fusionists. We can reconstruct her argumentative strategy in two 
steps, which rebut different strands of the fusionist project (120). Some fusionists 
maintain that the separation of Equity from common law is a historical accident, 
so that little of substance would be lost by formalizing its rules in the style of 
property and contract.4 Others grant that Equity pursues a distinctive normative 
ideal but suggest that this ideal is unjustifiable in a modern legal order.5 Samet 
argues, first, that Equity is not just a grab bag of doctrines that happen to share 
an  origin; rather, it is unified around a distinctive normative ideal. This ideal 
would be undermined in a fused legal system, because it requires the flexible 
and particularistic approach that is typical of Equity as opposed to common law 
(2). Second, Samet argues that the normative ideal served by Equity is still worth 
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I would like to thank Larissa Katz, Ngozi Okidegbe, Gurpreet Rattan, and Richa Sandill for their 
comments on an earlier draft of this review.
1 In this review, I will follow the convention of using ‘Equity’ to refer to the law (both proce-
dural and substantive) originating in Courts of Chancery and ‘equity’ to refer to the concept 
of doing justice in particular cases. 
2 Earl of Oxford’s Case (1615), 21 ER 485. 
3 On ‘backwards-looking,’ see Thorner v Major, [2009] UKHL 18 at para 101. 
4 See Andrew Burrows, ‘We Do This at Common Law But That in Equity’ (2002) 22:1 Oxford 
J Leg Stud 1 [Burrows, ‘We Do This’]; Sarah Worthington, Equity, 2d ed (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), ch 1. 
5 For related discussion, see Peter Birks, ‘Equity in the Modern Law: An Exercise in Taxonomy’ 




























































pursuing in a modern legal order (30). Other things being equal, then, we ought 
to keep Equity separate from common law.
The book’s first chapter surveys the fusion debate, sets out the main lines of 
Samet’s account of Equity and responds to fundamental objections. In the next 
three chapters, Samet offers detailed interpretations of three areas of Equitable 
doctrine: proprietary estoppel, fiduciary law, and the ‘clean hands’ principle. 
These interpretations serve both to articulate Samet’s account of the purpose 
of Equity and to support her claim that this purpose would be undermined if 
Equitable doctrines were fused with the common law. Along the way, Samet 
engages with scholarship not only in law but also in moral philosophy, political 
theory, and economics. The range and detail of Samet’s book is a strength, but 
it means that a review like this one will have to leave a lot out. I will focus on the 
core of Samet’s account and raise two questions, corresponding to the first and 
second steps in my reconstruction of her argument. First, how far does Samet’s 
proposed ideal fit with the doctrines of Equity? Second, does it justify retaining 
those doctrines against the fusionists? I will suggest that, though its immediate 
aim is to respond to fusionism, Samet’s work also brings into the open a larger 
controversy about the purpose of private law. 
The ideal which, on Samet’s account, Equity serves to promote is Accounta-
bility Correspondence (AC): ‘When legal rules impose liability it should ideally 
correspond to the pattern of moral duty in the circumstances to which the rules 
apply’ (28). AC is very general: it says nothing about what the patterns of moral 
duty in fact are, or in which circumstances legal rules should impose liability, but 
only specifies that liability ought to correspond to moral duty. Indeed, we might 
worry that AC is too general to be distinctive of Equity: what about other appar-
ently morally laden bodies of law, such as tort or even criminal law? Surely Equity 
aims to enforce a special class of moral duties rather than moral duties as such? 
I will return to this worry below. For now, we can get a sense of the role that AC 
plays by contrasting it with another, more familiar legal ideal, the Rule of Law 
(ROL): ‘an exemplary state of affairs wherein the government in all its actions 
is bound by legal norms fixed and announced beforehand so that people can 
foresee with fair certainty how the authority will use its coercive powers in given 
circumstances’ (16). Samet suggests that much of private law, such as the law of 
property and contract, is composed of general, precise rules so as to promote the 
ROL (33). AC has a parallel relation to the particularistic, flexible rules of Equity.
Samet does not deny that the ROL is a good thing. Nor does she deny that 
its demands can be in tension with those of AC (42). How, then, do the two ide-
als relate to each other? The answer is simple: AC is a value as well as the ROL, 
and sometimes the latter ought to give way to the former (74). A legal order 
might satisfy various ROL criteria, with rules that are general, clear, prospective, 
non-contradictory, and so on – and still be defective.6 This reflects the formality 
of the ROL, which specifies the form of a legal order while leaving open – at least 
to a large degree – what the content of the laws ought to be. Moreover, a body 
6 For these and other rule of law criteria, see Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law (New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press, 1964), ch 2.
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of law composed of highly formal rules might allow for behaviour which, though 
technically legal, evades the law’s point. When faced with such ‘creative com-
pliance,’ regulators in tax and finance have responded using a ‘substance over 
form’ approach similar to that of AC (39).
Samet suggests that AC is closely tied to the language of ‘conscience’ which 
permeates Equity: ‘The concept of conscience is fundamental to Equity since it 
beautifully expresses its role as an advocate of Accountability Correspondence, as 
well as the mode of reasoning it employs in order to impel our legal system in the 
direction of this ideal’ (43; emphasis in original). She develops a sophisticated 
account of conscience, building on Immanuel Kant’s moral psychology. It com-
bines a meta-ethical claim – that there are objective moral principles – with an 
epistemic one – that ordinary individuals are able to know these principles. The 
trouble comes in applying these principles to particular circumstances. Here we 
can be led astray by our self-interest, which leads us to speciously justify our con-
duct to ourselves. Conscience, on Samet’s account, allows us to become aware of 
our self-serving rationalizations (56). A court of Equity, presupposing that individ-
uals have a conscience, exists to hold them to what they know is right: to ‘ correct 
Mens Consciences for Frauds, Breach of Trusts, Wrongs and Oppressions, of what 
Nature soever they be.’7 This is why Equity will intervene ‘only where sincere 
engagement with the moral aspects of [the individual’s] behaviour would readily 
reveal its illicit nature’ (61).
To see how this works, consider Samet’s interpretation of fiduciary law. Samet 
argues that fiduciary law creates a space for a distinctive kind of relationship cen-
tred on selflessness rather than self-interest (125); the language of ‘loyalty’ and 
‘conscience’ serves as a reminder – both to the court and to the fiduciary – of 
the moral duties that the fiduciary owes to the principal (150). (Kantian moral 
psychology, in which self-interest distorts our application of moral rules to our 
circumstances, seems especially apt as a description of the fiduciary who has to 
decide whether they stand in a conflict of interest.) Supposing that the fiduciary 
does have a moral duty of selfless conduct in favour of the principal, a body of 
law that enforces this duty will thereby promote AC. This feature would be lost if, 
as fusionists propose, fiduciary law were simply folded into contract law as a set of 
implied terms for various types of contract, since parties to an ordinary contract 
are not in general obliged to behave selflessly (130).
We might wonder, though, whether this sort of account, which places great 
emphasis on the duties of the fiduciary, and comparatively little on the rights of 
the principal, could be extended to the neighbouring area of Equitable property 
rights, such as the right of a beneficiary under a trust. For it is unclear how any 
amount of moral or legal duty on the part of the trustee alone could generate a 
proprietary right on the part of the beneficiary. Samet addresses this point in the 
introduction to her book, where she explains why the book does not discuss trust 
law (xvii). One reason for this omission is dialectical: the book is a defence of 
Equity against the fusionists, and trust law is not a popular candidate for fusion.8 
7 Earl of Oxford’s Case, supra note 2.
8 See e.g. Burrows, ‘We Do This,’ supra note 4 at 5. 
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Another reason, however, is that trust law – with its precise rules and its strict 
liability for trustees – is simply a poor fit for the book’s explanatory framework.
Here as elsewhere, Samet shows an undogmatic willingness to allow that differ-
ent bodies of law might need to be explained in different ways. Still, the resulting 
situation is not fully satisfactory. Not only is trust law a central part of the law his-
torically developed by courts of Equity: it also has clear continuities with the more 
explicitly conscience-based bodies of law which Samet treats (xvii). For example, 
in Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington LBC, Lord Browne-Wilkinson 
took it as ‘uncontroversial’ that ‘the equitable jurisdiction to enforce trusts 
depends upon the conscience of the holder of the legal interest being affected.’9 
It would be worth considering how much of trust law could, in fact, be explained 
by Samet’s theory.
This might require Samet to address a question on which her book appears to 
remain neutral. The book addresses itself to the normative question of whether 
Equity’s separateness is justified, or whether it ought to be fused with the com-
mon law. It says little about the more conceptual question of what Equity is, or 
what distinguishes Equitable rights from rights at common law. For example, 
what is the nature of Equitable title, and how is it distinct from common law title? 
This is the sort of thing at issue between theorists like Frederic William Maitland, 
who argue that Equitable rights are always personal, and those like James Penner, 
who argue that Equitable title is a property right, just as it sounds.10 A version 
of Maitland’s theory has recently been developed by Robert Stevens and Ben 
McFarlane, who suggest that Equitable rights are ‘rights in rights’ – for example, 
if A holds land in trust for B, then A has a right to the land and B has a right in 
A’s right.11
My suspicion is that Samet’s account is less neutral on this question than it 
might appear. Her focus on conscience as the animating idea of Equity could be 
taken to underpin the ‘obligational’ theory of Maitland, Stevens, and McFarlane, 
on the basis that it is precisely by operating on the conscience of rights-holders 
that Equity creates new rights in rights. If this is correct, the work of these the-
orists may offer a way of extending Samet’s theory to explain at least the main 
principles of trust law. Moreover, to the extent that Samet provides a justification 
of Equity, we might wonder whether those principles that are not explicable by 
her theory appear defective in this light.
Supposing that Equity is best understood as promoting AC, a different sort of 
fusionist may doubt that AC is worth promoting. Is it really acceptable to exercise 
the coercive power of the state to make people carry out their moral duties? If 
so, is it acceptable for moral duties as such, or only for those belonging to some 
9 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington LBC, [1996] UKHL 12. On the role of 
 conscience in the constructive trust, see Soulos v Korkontzilas, [1997] 2 SCR 217 at paras 29, 43.
10 Frederick W Maitland, Equity: A Course of Lectures (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 1969), Lecture X [Maitland, Equity]; James E Penner, ‘The (True) Nature of a Benefi-
ciary’s Equitable Property Interest under a Trust’ (2014) 27:2 Can JL & Jur 473.
11 Robert Stevens & Ben McFarlane, ‘The Nature of Equitable Property’ (2010) 4:1  J  Equity. See 
also Lionel D Smith, ‘Trust and Patrimony’ (2008) 38:2 Revue générale de droit 379. 
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special class? One reason that Samet gives for AC is that a legal order which 
satisfies it will be perceived to be legitimate and that this perception ‘translates 
into willingness to obey the law’ (31).12 But a deeper reason can be found in the 
broad tradition in which Samet is working. In this tradition, which originates with 
Joseph Raz and John Gardner, not only is it acceptable for law to serve morality: 
the authority of law depends on its doing so.13 A legal order which satisfies AC will 
not only appear more legitimate, but will be more legitimate. Relying on this view 
of the relation between law and morality is not a weakness in Samet’s account, but 
I want to suggest that certain objections to the view emerge with particular force 
in the present context.
We should distinguish two reasons for concern about the justifiability of AC. 
The first is based on doubts about moral knowledge: either there are no moral 
truths or, if such truths exist, we have no way of coming to know them as would 
be required by a court of Equity. While moral anti-realism and scepticism may 
have implications for general jurisprudence, it seems to me that they have little 
specific bearing on the theory of Equity. In any event, Samet defends her moral 
realism, making reference to relevant work in meta-ethics in an appendix (197).
She does less to address a second reason for concern about AC: namely, that it 
is inconsistent with the neutrality that is required of a liberal state. As John Rawls 
argued in Political Liberalism, modern societies are characterized by ‘a pluralism of 
incompatible yet reasonable comprehensive doctrines.’14 People are committed 
to deeply divergent world-views, and a modern legal order is constrained by this 
fact. Rawls suggested that laws should be justified only in terms of ‘public reason,’ 
which is neutral on certain fundamental questions.15 Two centuries earlier, Kant 
defended an even stronger version of liberal neutrality in which questions of mor-
als are to be kept apart from questions of right. Lawmakers should not ask what 
people ought to do but, rather, what they can legitimately be coerced to do.16 
Even if we can know moral truths, then, it might not be legitimate for the law to 
coerce people to act in accordance with them. Fusionists may argue that the very 
features that, in Samet’s view, make Equity distinctive – its morally freighted lan-
guage and flexible application – also make Equity distinctively problematic from 
the point of view of liberal neutrality.
This issue becomes particularly pressing when we consider Samet’s discussion 
of the ‘clean hands’ doctrine. When granting Equitable relief to a plaintiff would 
involve the court in some wrongdoing – for example, by allowing the plaintiff to 
carry out a fraud – the court may refuse its help on the principle that ‘he who 
comes to Equity must come with clean hands.’ Samet interprets this doctrine 
12 For a similar argument, see Matthew Harding, ‘Equity and the Rule of Law’ (2016) 132 Law 
Q Rev 278 at 297 [Harding, ‘Equity’].
13 See Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), ch 3; John 
Gardner, Law as a Leap of Faith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), ch 6. 
14 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993) at xvi.
15 See John Rawls, ‘The Idea of Public Reason Revisited’ (1997) 63:4 U Chicago L Rev 765.
16 Arthur Ripstein, Force and Freedom (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009) at 14; c.f. 
Japa Palikkathayil, ‘Neither Perfectionism nor Political Liberalism’ (2016) 44:3 Philosophy & 
Public Affairs 171.
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by way of a creative analogy with Bernard Williams’s notion of integrity.17 For 
Williams, this notion expresses our concern not only with what happens in the 
world, but also with our contribution to what happens, and with whether our 
contribution is consistent with our deepest ethical commitments. Samet suggests, 
similarly, that in certain cases the court must refuse its help to a plaintiff purely in 
order to safeguard its integrity as an institution committed to justice (180). This 
seems right, but can a court invoke its integrity in relation to just any kind of seri-
ous wrongdoing? Samet raises the possibility that courts might use the doctrine 
to exclude greedy company executives who seek to enforce contracts for ‘overtly 
excessive remuneration’ (155) or to reject claims ‘made in the context of using 
premises for prostitution’ (182). The only common factor seems to be that the 
court considers these things to be seriously wrong. In this way, the ‘clean hands’ 
doctrine threatens to allow for unconstrained moralism in the law.
In response to this concern, we might try to draw on some commonplace 
ideas about Equity to narrow the range of relevant moral duties. Like many other 
Equitable doctrines, the ‘clean hands’ doctrine is second-order law, operating on 
top of a prior and complete set of legal rules.18 It responds to a specific kind of 
injustice – the sort which occurs when, as Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel wrote,
a legal process, in itself in any case a means, now begins to be something external to its end 
and contrasted with it. This long course of formalities is a right of the parties at law and 
they have the right to traverse it from beginning to end. Still, it may be turned into an evil, 
and even an instrument of wrong . . . .19
In other words, Equity responds to the way that the formalization of justice can 
itself work injustice.20 If this is right, then the moral duties enforced by Equity are 
of the same kind as those that the common law aims to enforce, and there is no 
prospect of unconstrained moralism.
It is not clear whether Samet would, or could, agree with this suggestion. Her 
canonical statement of AC, which makes Equitable intervention conditional on 
legal rules which already impose liability, might be read in this way (28). But her 
accounts of proprietary estoppel and fiduciary relationships pull in the opposite 
direction. While property and contract rules provide a framework for equal free-
dom under law, these domains of Equity hold us to higher standards of interper-
sonal conduct. More importantly, then, reading Samet in line with commonplace 
17 JJC Smart & Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1973), s 5. 
18 Maitland, Equity, supra note 10, Lecture XII. The idea of Equity as ‘second-order’ law, 
 responding to opportunistic uses of legal rules, is from Henry Smith. See Henry Smith, 
‘ Equity as Second-Order Law: The Problem of Opportunism’ (2015) [unpublished], online: 
<ssrn.com/abstract=2617413>. We might see the ‘clean hands’ doctrine as third-order law, 
responding to opportunistic uses of Equitable rules. 
19 Georg WF Hegel, Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, translated by Thomas M Knox (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1968), s 223.
20 Harding, ‘Equity,’ supra note 12 at 301; Dennis Klimchuk, ‘Equity and the Rule of Law’ in 
Lisa M Austin & Dennis Klimchuk, eds, Private Law and the Rule of Law (Oxford: Oxford 
 University Press, 2014) 247. 
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ideas about Equity would blunt the political edge of her account. The role of 
Equity, at least in part, is not to perfect the common law’s pursuit of its own 
ideals, but to promote a different ideal. The debate with the fusionist is really ‘a 
political controversy about the role of the state’ (151). Samet’s Equity brings this 
controversy into the open.
Manish Oza
University of Toronto Department of Philosophy
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